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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sonny Dean Farrow appeals from the judgment dismissing his petition for postconviction relief, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion for a continuance.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case Farrow was convicted of two counts of domestic
battery. (R., p.4.) Following a guilty plea, Farrow was sentenced to consecutive prison
sentences of nine years, with five years fixed, and three years, with one year fixed. (R.,
pp.4-5.)
Farrow filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.4-10.) He alleged
that trial counsel gave ineffective assistance “by neglect[ing] to file [a] motion for a rule
35 on time.” (R., p.5.) The state filed an answer (R., pp.11-14) and a motion for
summary disposition, in which it argued that even if the failure to file a Rule 35 motion
was deficient performance, “which is not conceded by the State, there is nonetheless
simply no support for any contention that Petitioner was prejudiced” (R., p.41).
The district court appointed counsel. (R., pp.30-31.)

Farrow’s counsel filed a

stipulation with the state to continue the hearing on the state’s summary disposition
motion. (R., pp.44-45.) Thereafter, the district court denied the parties’ stipulation
without any initial explanation why. (R., pp.46-47.)
At the disposition motion hearing the district court explained that it denied the
stipulation to continue “primarily because there was no reason given for that stipulation.”
(Tr., p.3, Ls.17-20.) The court also pointed out that Farrow’s counsel had not submitted
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anything “in response to [the state’s] motion for summary disposition.” (Tr., p.3, Ls.816.) Because the state had no objection to the late filing, the district court allowed postconviction counsel to file an affidavit from trial counsel (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-24), who stated
that “I did not timely file the requested Rule 35 Motion due to misreading my calendar”
(R., p.49).
The state maintained that, even assuming trial counsel’s administrative blooper
showed deficient performance, Farrow had not “met his burden with regard to the
Strickland 1 prejudice prong” because there was no evidence that the Rule 35 motion
would have been granted. (Tr., p.9, L.6 – p.10, L.16.)
Farrow’s counsel then made an “offer of proof for this hearing,” explaining what
Farrow “would be able to tell Court” to show his Rule 35 motion would have been
granted. (Tr., p.17, L.23 – p.19, L.5.) The district court pointed out counsel’s offer of
proof was not admissible evidence, and noted there was no other evidence in front of it,
such as “a late affidavit of Mr. Farrow just like you filed the late affidavit of [trial
counsel].” (Tr., p.19, Ls.6-15.) Farrow’s counsel agreed there was no such admissible
evidence before the district court, but, offered that “I would be happy to, in addition to the
offer of proof, have Mr. Farrow either prepare an affidavit or I would ask to continue
this.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.4-21.)
Without directly addressing the remark about a continuance, the district court
concluded Farrow failed to show prejudice:
[The prosecutor] is correct that there is no evidence before me at all that
had [trial counsel] timey filed a Rule 35 motion that that motion would be
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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successful, and my questions have gone to I guess the building blocks for
that ultimate conclusion, and the building blocks are not even present.
There’s—there’s no evidence before me today [of what] the two remedies
Mr. Farrow sought—would’ve sought in his Rule 35 motion, whether it be
a correction or a reduction. There’s no proof as to what Mr. Farrow’s
institutional performance was or what new information or what additional
information that was [not] given to the Court at the rider review. There’s
nothing, and the time for that, the presentation of that was any time after
the petition was filed on May 1st, 2017, up to today….
There’s been all this time to file an affidavit from Mr. Farrow, and there’s
no affidavit from Mr. Farrow. The—there’s no prejudice that’s been
demonstrated, no likelihood of success on the merits of a Rule 35, so
there’s a Strickland prong that’s completely unsatisfied.
(Tr., p.20, L.17 – p.21, L.16.) The district court accordingly granted the state’s motion
for summary disposition and dismissed the post-conviction petition. (R., pp.15-16.)
Farrow timely appeals. (R., pp.17-19.)
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ISSUE
Farrow states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Farrow’s motion
for a continuance?
(Appellant’s brief, p3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Farrow failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying the
stipulation to continue or any implied motion to continue?
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ARGUMENT
Farrow Fails To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying The
Stipulation For A Continuance Or Any Implied Motion For A Continuance
A.

Introduction
The district court explained that it previously denied the state’s and Farrow’s

stipulation for a continuance “because there was no reason given” for it. (Tr., p.3, Ls.1720.) Later on, confronting his proof problems in surviving the state’s dismissal motion,
Farrow remarked that “I would ask to continue this so we can get him on the phone….”
(Tr., p.19, Ls.20-21.)

The district court summarily dismissed the petition without

explicitly2 mentioning the remarks about another continuance. (Tr., p.20, L.14 – p.21,
L.24.)
Claiming error on appeal, Farrow appears to have merged these two separate
events: Farrow uses the monolithic shorthand of “the motion for a continuance” when
talking about the stipulation to continue, but also when referring to counsel’s remarks
during the summary dismissal hearing. (See generally, Appellant’s brief.) Farrow argues
that his “interest in obtaining a continuance [was] extremely high, because without
evidence of prejudice he could not prevail on a motion for summary dismissal,” and
concludes “in weighing his interests against those of the State, it is clear that the district
court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.5-6.)
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The district court’s statement that “[t]he motion’s denied,” could plausibly be a
reference to Farrow’s remarks about a continuance. (See Tr., p.21, L.24.) But, it is
unclear from the transcript whether this is what the court meant.
5

Farrow fails to show the district court abused its discretion. To be clear from the
start, there was no single “motion for a continuance” encompassing the original
stipulation and Farrow’s latter offhand remarks about a continuance. (R., pp.44-45; Tr.,
p.3, L.17 – p.4, L.4; p.19, Ls.17-25.)

These were separate things and should be

disentangled and analyzed separately on appeal.
As for the stipulation to continue, the district court denied it because Farrow did
not provide any reason for it. (Tr., p.3, Ls.17-20.) Farrow fails to show this was abuse of
discretion. And as for Farrow’s subsequent remarks at the hearing—even assuming they
amounted to another motion for a continuance—Farrow fails to show the district court
abused its discretion by denying the implied motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether “to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court.” State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 706, 864 P.2d 149, 152
(1993); State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793, 760 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Ct. App. 1988).
When an appellant claims the district court abused its discretion, “the inquiry involves (1)
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.” Ransom, 124 Idaho at 706, 864 P.2d at 152.
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C.

Farrow Fails To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying The
Parties’ Stipulation For A Continuance
Generally speaking, “unless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have

been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can
only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.” State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797,
891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202, 485 P.2d 144,
146 (1971). “‘Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.
Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at
the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for
compelling reasons.’” Cagle, 126 Idaho at 797, 891 P.2d at 1057 (quoting Carman, 114
Idaho at 793, 760 P.2d at 1209); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 (1983).
In light of these standards the district court had a perfectly good reason to deny the
stipulation to continue: Farrow did not say why a continuance was necessary. As the
court pointed out at the hearing,
There was a stipulation to continue this hearing, and I read through that
stipulation and I denied it primarily because there was no reason given for
that stipulation. The Supreme Court’s been consistent in telling us judges
that there are certain things that should be in place any time a motion for
continuance or even a stipulation is given, and one of those things is that
the client, him or herself, was contacted and consented. I didn’t see any
reason given for the stipulation. I certainly didn’t see any of the ordinary
things I would expect to see addressed in a motion to continue or a
stipulation to continue.
That’s why I denied the motion.
(Tr., p.3, L.17 – p.4, L.4 (emphasis added).)
This was not an abuse of discretion. Farrow gave no reason at all why he needed
a continuance, nor did he allege any negative outcome whatsoever—much less a
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“substantial rights” deprivation—would occur without one. (See R., pp.44-45.) The
district court was thus well within its discretion to deny the motion—because it is plainly
not an abuse of discretion to deny an unsupported motion.
Farrow now argues that the district court abused its discretion by not explicitly
weighing the parties’ competing interests in a continuance. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)
Citing to Ransom, 124 Idaho at 707, 864 P.2d at 153, Farrow argues that the court’s
“proper role relative to evaluating [a] motion for a continuance necessitate[s] weighing
the competing interests of the State and the defendant,” and that “[b]ecause the district
court did not weigh the competing interests, it [did] not apply the proper legal standard
and did not reach its conclusion through and exercise of reason.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
This argument fails. While the state admittedly had no “competing” interest in
denying the requested continuance (insofar as the state stipulated it should be granted),
the district court did not abuse its discretion by not explicitly weighing the interests.
Since Ransom, the Idaho Supreme Court explained why the “weighing” exercise
mattered—not because it was a compulsory part of the legal standard, but because the
exercise itself showed the district court was correctly apprehending its discretion and
acting within it:
The weighing process reflects the fact that the district court perceived the
issue as one of discretion and the record demonstrates that it acted within
the boundaries of that discretion.
State v. Miller, 133 Idaho 454, 458, 988 P.2d 680, 684 (1999).
Here, regardless of the lack of any explicit weighing, the record still shows the
district court acted within its discretion. The district court denied the motion because it
was unsupported, which shows an equal amount of discernment and thoughtfulness as
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any weighing exercise. (See Tr., p.3, L.17 – p.4, L.4.) And even assuming a weighing
exercise was called for here, a denial still would have been appropriate. Because Farrow
never stated what the actual interest in a continuance was, there was no weight tipping the
scales in favor of granting the stipulation. In any event, Farrow fails to show the district
court abused its discretion by denying the stipulation to continue.

D.

Even If There Was A Subsequent Implied Motion To Continue, Farrow Fails To
Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying It
After the district court explained why it had denied the parties’ stipulation for a

continuance, the court turned to the state’s motion to summarily dismiss Farrow’s petition
for post-conviction relief. (Tr., p.4, Ls.4-6.) The state argued, and the district court
agreed, that Farrow had not alleged any facts that would show he was prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to file a Rule 35 motion. (See Tr., p.10, Ls.4-16; p.17, Ls.5-22.) That
discussion led to the following exchange:
THE COURT: I’ll just quote Idaho Code 19-4903. “A petition for postconviction relief cannot provide mere notice but must be verified with
respect to facts known by the petitioner and present admissible evidence
supporting the allegations,” so what you just argued, there’s nothing in the
record to support any of that. [Farrow’s] performance in prison, how a
lesser sentence would put him in better stead or sooner stead [sic] with the
parole commission, I don’t have any of that in front of me by way of
admissible evidence.
[Post-Conviction Counsel] MR. PIERCE: And I’m making an offer of
proof for this hearing.
THE COURT: An offer of proof isn’t admissible evidence.
MR. PIERCE: That’s—that’s correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So you had an opportunity up until 30 minutes ago when
we started this to file a late affidavit of Mr. Farrow just like you filed the
late affidavit of [trial counsel] but one that maybe gave me more
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admissible evidence as to facts that Mr. Farrow knew, and I don’t have
that, correct?
MR. PIERCE: Not at this time, Your Honor, no.
THE COURT: All right. Any other argument?
MR. PIERCE: Well, I would—I would be happy to, in addition to the offer
of proof, have Mr. Farrow either prepare an affidavit or I would ask to
continue this so that we can get him on the phone to explain to the Court
what he’s been doing in prison and what he’s learned about the sentence
and how it affects work crews and things such as that. Now I would—well,
I will leave it at that.
(Tr., p.18, L.19 – p.19, L.25.) The district court granted the state’s motion for summary
disposition without explicitly mentioning counsel’s remark that he “would ask” to
continue. (Tr., p.20, L.14 – p.22, L.10.)
Even if this sequence amounted to an implied motion to continue (and denial of
the motion), Farrow fails to show an abuse of discretion. “A bare claim that additional
investigation could have been conducted is not sufficient to demonstrate unfair prejudice
so as to support a motion for a continuance.” State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 311, 955 P.2d
1082, 1090 (1998); State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995); State v.
Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1034, 812 P.2d 744, 748 (Ct.App.1991). That is exactly what
Farrow is now alleging on appeal: had the district court granted the implied motion,
Farrow’s counsel could have gone off and conducted some investigation, to drum up the
“absolutely crucial” evidence that he belatedly realized he needed to provide. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)
But this is insufficient to justify a motion to continue. That is especially true here,
where the district court pointed out that counsel, for months, had “all this time to file an
affidavit from Mr. Farrow” containing the “absolutely crucial” evidence. (Tr., p.19,
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Ls.10-16; see Appellant’s brief, p.5.) And despite having that “opportunity up until 30
minutes ago,” counsel, without explanation, had not done so. (Tr., p.19, Ls.10-16.) Not
only that, but counsel had already filed another untimely affidavit earlier in the hearing—
with no logical explanation for the delay3—which the district court only “reluctantly”
allowed in because the state had no objection to the late filing. (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-23.) In
light of counsel’s repeated failures to timely file crucial affidavits, the district court was
not required to keep overlooking counsel’s failures to do “what any reasonable counsel
should’ve done,” and indulge yet another unexplained entreaty for a late submission of
evidence. (Tr., p.21, Ls.18-23.)
In light of post-conviction counsel’s inexplicable failure to timely prosecute his
case, and because bare requests for additional investigation are insufficient to support a
continuance request, the district court was well within its discretion to dismiss the
petition and deny any implied motion for a continuance.

3

Post-conviction counsel’s explanation for the first late filing left much to be desired:
THE COURT: I’m really not understanding your reasons why [the first
affidavit] wasn’t filed sometime in the last five weeks.
MR. PIERCE: I was going to file it with my brief in response.
THE COURT: But you didn’t file a brief in response timely relative to the
hearing which is today.
MR. PIERCE: That’s—that’s correct Your Honor.

(Tr., p.6, Ls.6-14.)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment dismissing the
petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of December, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
by means of iCourt File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
KDG/dd
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